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Abstract
Establishment of the Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines was regarded by many
international law scholars, international activists, diplomats and international organization
personnel as a defining, ‘democratizing’ change in the way international law is made. By
bringing international NGOs — what is often called ‘international civil society’ — into the
diplomatic and international law-making process, many believe that the Ottawa Convention
represented both a democratization of, and a new source of legitimacy for, international law,
in part because it was presumably made ‘from below.’ This article sharply questions whether
the Ottawa Convention and the process leading up to it represents any real ‘democratization’
of international law, challenges the idea that there is even such a thing as ‘international civil
society,’ at least in the sense that it is democratic and comes ‘from below,’ and disputes that
there can be such a thing as ‘democratic’ processes at the global level. It suggests, by way of
alternative, that the Ottawa Convention and the process leading up to it should be seen as a
step in the development of global transnational elites at the expense of genuinely democratic,
but hence local, processes.
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1 Introduction: A Sea-Change in the International Legal
Order?
For many whose professional work is international public law and policy, the most
significant legal events of the entire 1990s were the signing of the Landmines Treaty
(the Ottawa Convention)1 and the signing of the International Criminal Court (the
ICC) statute (the Rome Statute).2 Even recognizing other key legal events during the
decade, such as the establishment of the ad hoc Yugoslavia and Rwanda war crimes
tribunals,3 for many the Ottawa Convention and the Rome Statute especially
epitomized fundamental changes in the nature of the international legal system —
changes that in a hundred years, perhaps, would be seen as the critical beginnings of a
new international system.
This enthusiasm is easy to understand. The Ottawa Convention represents the first
time in over a century in which a major, traditional weapon system has been banned
outright and not simply regulated in its use, by a treaty that has broad participation by
states. Moreover (and conceptually still more importantly) the Ottawa Convention
represents, especially to the NGO activist community, the victory of what nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and now many others call ‘international civil
society’4 — the successful entry of international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) into diplomatic and lawmaking processes that hitherto have been reserved
largely to states and international organizations, represented by officially recognized
and accredited diplomats. It is, according to this view of things, the ‘democratization of
international law’.5
The Rome Statute, for its part, represents in the minds of its supporters — and
especially for the international NGOs — the establishment of the rule of law in the
international community, solidified with a prosecutor, judges, and criminal sanctions
against individuals rather than morally more opaque sanctions against states.6 It is —
1

2

3

4
5
6

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction (the ‘Ottawa Convention’), 36 ILM (1997) 1507, entered into force 1 March
1999.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the ‘Rome Statute’), 37 ILM (1998) 999, adopted by
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 17 July 1998.
See generally Y. Beijbeder and T. van Boven, Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice
(1999).
See discussion at Part 2, Section B, supra.
Ibid.
For a representative view from a prominent international NGO activist, see A. Neier, War Crimes:
Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (1998). Neier is president of the Open Society
Institute and was formerly executive director of Human Rights Watch. Kenneth Roth, the current
executive director of Human Rights Watch, has said in conferences and meetings in 1998–1999 that the
formation of the International Criminal Court is the most important advance in international human
rights of the 1990s. See also, among many similar statements from Human Rights Watch and the
numerous other international NGOs who formed the NGO coalition in favour of the ICC, Ken Roth,
Memorandum to Human Rights Watch Board, Advisory Committees, Council, and Friends and
Supporters, ‘Advisory on HRW’s Campaign for an International Criminal Court’, describing the ICC as
‘one of Human Rights Watch’s most important priorities’, 11 August 1998.
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for those who believe that the Rome Statute will work out as planned, at least — the
realization of what for so long had been merely the utopian aspirations of those for
whom only the true political legitimacy is international legitimacy and for whom
merely sovereign states are something whose historical time is past, except as
constitutionally subsidiary entities within the larger empire of world governance
through the global rule of law.7 The Rome Statute stands, in the minds of its
enthusiasts, for the proposition that justice is universal and that universalism’s
supreme expression must be international; it stands for the sovereignty of international justice over other institutions.8
The importance of these two treaties thus appears considerable: presumably,
according to their supporters, they epitomize the democratization of international
law, on the one hand, and the assertion of its genuine sovereignty over all other
assertions of sovereignty, on the other. I say this as someone who has laboured long as
an activist on behalf of the Ottawa Convention, but who fully (and perhaps
surprisingly) opposes the scope and aspirations of the Rome Statute.9 Even as
someone, in other words, who is without sympathy for what I regard as the imperial
agenda of international law,10 I nonetheless acknowledge these two treaties as
critical, perhaps the critical, legal events of the first post-Cold War decade.
Nevertheless, it is possible to be sceptical of the factual assertion that these treaties
have such grandiose importance. One can doubt that they indeed represent watershed
events in the history of international order and organization. The principal basis for
this scepticism — the fly in the ointment, so to speak, of this putatively ‘realized
utopianism’ — is simply that the United States has stood aside from each of these

7

8

9

10

For example, Neier writes with respect to the ICC, the ICC would have a ‘mandate to deal with those who
commit crimes within its jurisdiction whether they are from small states in Central Europe or Central
Africa or from the richest and most powerful nations on earth’. Neier, ibid. at 259.
The literature written by international lawyers in support of this proposition is voluminous;
representative of it within the past several years are Neier, ibid.; M.F. Harris et al., Making Justice Work: The
Report of the Century Foundation/Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Apprehending Indicted War Criminals
(1998); Y. Beigbeder and T. Van Boven, Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (1999);
J.R.W.D. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(1998); H. Ball, Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth Century Experience (1999); and R.
Stenson and M. Sann (eds), The Prosecution of International Crimes (1996). One might also usefully consult
the voluminous reports and press releases reflecting this theme from Human Rights Watch, available at
www.hrw.org
Some examples of American opposition to the ICC include Frum, ‘The International Criminal Court Must
Die’, The Weekly Standard (Washington DC), 10/17 August 1998, at 27; Helms, ‘Personal View: Jesse
Helms: Voting Against the International Criminal Court is Not Enough. The US Should Try To Bring It
Down’, The Financial Times, 31 July 1998, at 18. A thoughtful discussion of shortcomings of the current
ICC statute by a prominent American expert in human rights and humanitarian law — and certainly no
enemy to the idea of an international criminal court — is found at Meron, ‘The Court We Want’,
Washington Post, 13 October 1998, at A15; for a version of the standard moralizing lecture directed at
Washington DC from Europe for its failure to join the Rome Statute, see The Economist, ‘World Law and
World Power’ (US ed.), 5 December 1998, at 16. A different critique of the ICC is made by a
non-American, Sellars, ‘The Tyranny of Human Rights’, Spectator (London), 28 August 1999, at 11; she
argues that ‘war-crimes tribunals advance the global aims of Western leaders’.
See discussion at Part 1, supra.
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treaties. It has joined neither the Ottawa Convention nor the Rome Statute, and it
appears unlikely that it will do so in the foreseeable future.11 This inconvenient fact
raises a problem for those who want to see these treaties as a sea-change, desirable or
not, in the nature of international order: expressed brutally, what profound change
can these treaties purport to signal if the largest and most powerful state, the world’s
only superpower, the only military power capable of projecting force across the globe,
stands aside from them?
This paper attempts a preliminary assessment of one aspect of this problem — how
to understand the role of the international NGOs that have driven so much of the
debates leading to these two treaties, and which have proven to be the indispensable
interlocutors of the United States in its refusal to join either treaty—interlocutors, in
some respects, even more important than other governments in the negotiations. The
discussion will be limited to the Ottawa Convention, but the analysis has certain
implications for the Rome Statute. In the course of this assessment, however, it
suggests a sharply different way of thinking about the Ottawa Convention and, by
implication, the Rome Statute, and the processes that led to them, than is typically
held among those who pay attention to public international law and policy. In
focusing on how to understand the participation of international NGOs as advocates
campaigning for and negotiating these treaties, it devolves on to the question of the
role and meaning of ‘international civil society’.
It should be understood at the outset, however, that these remarks are necessarily
speculative. It is far too soon to know the real effects of either the landmines ban or the
ICC, the effects of the United States remaining outside these regimes, or even whether
the United States will remain outside. It is far too soon to know whether either of these
treaties will permanently achieve its stated goals or even see its mechanisms put into
place in a stable way. And if that is too soon to know, it is likewise too soon to know
whether these treaties indeed represent any kind of sea-change in how international
law is made and how the international system works.
Moreover, the primary materials for knowing what has gone on in the processes of
reaching these treaties are still largely oral histories. Very little of those histories have
as yet been written down in an analytically historical way, as respectably published
sources that one could cite in traditional, academic law journal fashion. For that
reason I will freely draw on my personal experiences as an international NGO activist

11

On the US refusal to sign the Ottawa Convention, see Lobe, ‘Disarmament: US Considers Signing
Landmine Ban By 2006’, Inter Press Service, 25 May 1998 (‘the administration refused to sign the
Ottawa Convention due to strong opposition from the Pentagon’); on background to the US refusal to sign
the Rome Statute, see Agence France Presse, ‘US Senators plan to oppose ICC, put pressure on
signatories’, 23 July 1998. Of course, one should never underestimate the vicissitudes of American
domestic politics. If the Democratic Party were to win both the White House and Congress in the next
election, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) were to die, and the Korean peninsula peacefully to reunify, then
matters might be different.
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during the years leading up to the Ottawa Convention.12 It should be understood, of
course, that other participants in those events will have sharply different understandings and interpretations of what went on — understandings and interpretations that
will often be far more consonant with the celebratory mood accompanying both the
Ottawa Convention and the Rome Statute among those who agitate for what I will
here describe as ‘international legal imperialism’.
These observations will be offered as modest but, I believe, vital evidence of a broad
thesis about international NGOs and their function in the current international
system. I give an interpretation of the way in which the Ottawa Convention came into
being, in the form of ‘seven lessons’ of the campaign to ban landmines, with particular
attention to the role of international NGOs and their relationship with international
organizations and sympathetic states. The nature of this relationship I will describe as
a ‘romance’, and suggest that it carries with it some dubious consequences. Having
made this commentary on the campaign, I turn to give a broader reading of the
meaning of the campaign as a critical commentary on two crucial ideas. The first is the
widespread belief that international NGOs constitute a kind of ‘international civil
society’, one which functions in a way analogous to ‘civil society’ within a settled
domestic society. The second is an interpretation of the relationship between
international NGOs and international organizations, characterizing it as one of
mutual legitimation; with respect to international organizations, international NGOs
are cast in the role of giving some veneer of democratic legitimacy to an international
system that, in my view, suffers from a permanently incurable democratic deficit.
We cannot turn to these themes, however, without a brief consideration of the
perhaps peculiar methodology that this article pursues.13

2 Liberal Internationalism or ‘Two Imperialisms’ or Both?
A A Brief Note on Methodological Prejudices
Before setting upon the crooked path by which I hope to illuminate the meaning of US
unilateralism or, better said, non-participation in the Ottawa Convention, we ought
12

13

I do not have the same extensive personal experience with the Rome Statute and the campaign leading up
to it. Moreover, its ‘inner’ history –– by this I mean the subjective but critically important tone, tenor, and
aspirational mood of the campaign for the treaty, especially among the international NGOs, whether of
the Rome Statute or the Ottawa Convention –– is even less a matter of written record at this point in time
than that of the Ottawa Convention. By contrast, in the case of the Ottawa Convention, I believe I have a
personal understanding of both the exterior and interior history of the campaign to ban landmines that
— even in a subjective and, to be sure, disputable way — carries some independent weight even where I
am reporting on my own personal experience.
The discussion of methodology in Part 2 may strike some as far afield from the issue of landmines and the
Ottawa Convention; my presentation and subsequent discussions with participants in the University of
Michigan Law Conference on Unilateralism at which this paper was first presented convince me,
however, that it is crucial to understanding what comes after it. Certainly participants in the conference
agreed with that assessment.
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first to sound the cautionary note that the issue of the United States abroad in the
world is not merely one of power. It is instead one of moral and political legitimacy. For
many it is consoling to believe that when the United States acts alone, acts contrary to
what many or even most other states would have it do, and acts contrary to those
states that have traditionally extruded themselves14 as the world’s conscience, it acts
merely from the surety of its own power. The United States’ ability to act contrary to
others is, according to this consolation, merely a matter of power, guns and butter, its
arrogance and obduracy. Such sentiments emerge when, for example, the US is
accused, upon its failure to join the Ottawa Convention, the Rome Statute, or for that
matter the Convention on the Rights of the Child15 or other treaties that have obtained
broad or even nearly total (if perhaps merely rhetorical) ratification, of consorting
with ‘rogue states’16 — Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, the whole shifting club of
rogues — or, still more provocatively, of being a rogue state itself.17
But however consoling, it is a stupidity.18 Admittedly it is one in which I have
indulged; as an activist seeking to shame the United States into joining the Ottawa
Convention, I have on occasion accused the United States of being no better in this

14

15

16

17

18

In lieu of GDP, as it were, recalling Stendhal: ‘That sort of fellow [Rousseau] wishes to argue about
everything, and has not a thousand crowns a year.’ Stendhal, The Red and the Black (2nd ed. 1984, trans.
C.K. Scott Moncrieff) 328.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. A/44/49 (adopted by the General Assembly, 20
November 1989; entered into force, 2 September 1990).
The most recent prominent place where the ‘rogue state’ assertion against the United States has appeared
is Judt, ‘A Superpower Flaunts Its Ignorance’, New York Times, 17 October 1999, section 4, p. 17, in
which Judt, writing following the US Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
declares that ‘if we behave like a rogue nation ourselves, smug in our monopoly of virtue and weapons,
how can we hope to bring pressure to bear on true rogue nations overseas?’ For a standard, US foreign
policy establishment-style analysis that frames the issue explicitly in terms of the US as a ‘rogue’ state, see
Manning, ‘U.S.: Global Steward or Rogue Power?’ The Straits Times (Singapore), 9 November 1999, at 54
(‘is the US the steward of global power or a rogue superpower?’).
Following the October 1999 refusal of the US Senate to ratify the test ban treaty, much commentary
erupted, particularly in Europe, in language similar to claims of the US as a ‘rogue state’; in particular,
French president Jacques Chirac delivered a remarkable speech on 4 November 1999, in which he
described the US as a ‘hyperpower’, and suggested that the European Union could flourish by seeking to
supplant the United States; the EU, according to Chirac, needed to consolidate the United Nations and
other international institutions to prevent the world from relying on the United States for financial
stability, cultural harmony and global security. See Fitchett, ‘Chirac’s Attack on Congress Has a Bigger
Target’, International Herald Tribune, 9 November 1999, at 2; Whitney, ‘France Presses for Power
Independent of the US’, New York Times, 7 November 1999, Section 1, p. 9; Hoagland, ‘American
Menace’, The Times (London), 4 November 1999; Graham, ‘Chirac Attacks American Attitudes’,
Financial Times, 5 November 1999, at 10.
One could just as easily turn the ‘consorting with rogue states’ proposition around, with respect to the
Rome Statute, for example, as the president of Freedom House, Adrian Karatnycky, did in the Wall Street
Journal, noting that the ‘U.S. — the world’s most important democracy — voted against the [ICC], as did
India — the world’s largest democracy — and Israel — a state built by the victims of genocide’.
Karatnycky, ‘Don’t Worry, War Criminals — The New Court Won’t Work’, Wall Street Journal, 27 July
1998, at A15; but see the reply, Kenneth Roth (Executive Director, Human Rights Watch), ‘We Need an
International Court’, Letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, 18 August 1998, at A23. But it is a silly
point, whichever way one turns it.
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regard than the rogues.19 Tempting but untrue, however; the power the United States
exercises in the world, for better and for worse, is embedded profoundly in a web of
claims to political and moral legitimacy (even if some of those claims are themselves
contradictory and competing). It is the world’s superpower not merely by strength of
its GDP and willingness to spend more than others on guns, but by assertion of these
moral and political claims to legitimacy, not merely within its borders, but upon the
world stage. One may dislike all or part of the basis of those claims to legitimacy, one
may think them specious or otherwise, but anyone imagining that to struggle with US
unilateralism, in the name of international legal order or anything else, is merely to
struggle with power harbours a serious delusion.20 The struggle is inevitably as much
or more with ideas as with power; surely this is obvious, but it seems sometimes
forgotten in the myopia of wishful and self-righteous internationalist thinking.
To frame the issue as one of US unilateralism, in other words, as against the
virtuously internationalist world gets it wrong. While all unilateral US actions
threaten the legitimacy of international legal imperialism, some unilateral US actions
tend in the direction of US imperialism as an alternative to what I have called
‘international legal imperialism’, the nascent imperialism, the willingness to impose
supranational rule, that is the consequence of assertions of the sovereignty of
supranational institutions. Whereas still others — regrettably fewer and fewer in
these days of Madeleine Albright21 — tend toward an anti-imperialism that, to be sure,
19

20

21

I am here partly reflecting self-critically on things I have said during the course of the NGO campaign to
ban landmines, in speeches and presentations. But I am also referring to similar remarks that Jody
Williams made when she received word that she had received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for her work on
the international landmines ban campaign; in press interviews she described the US position and
President Clinton in terms similar to the ‘rogue state’. See Goldberg, ‘Peace Prize Goes to Land-Mine
Opponents’, New York Times, 11 October 1997, at A-1, (quoting Williams, ‘I think it’s tragic that
President Clinton does not want to be on the side of humanity. . .’ and quoting Williams referring to
Clinton as ‘Billy’ and ‘a weenie’). At the time Ms Williams made these remarks, I applauded them, despite
criticism from others in the ban campaign, notably Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation executive
director Robert O. Muller, that such remarks were self-indulgent and failed to capture the deeper,
strategically critical understanding that the US position was not merely based on narrow calculation of
interest but on a broader ideological view of itself that simply could not be equated with the behaviour of
the usual club of rogue states. Indulging oneself in the fiction of thinking that the US was just another
rogue state was strategically dangerous for the campaign, a thoughtful senior advisor to the campaign
remarked to me privately at the time, because it meant that the campaign would crucially underestimate
the strength of the US refusal to sign the Ottawa Convention; better, said this advisor, to understand the
US position as a moral position, even if a wrong one, in order to understand the strength with which the
US would defend it. I thought at the time this advice was wrong; although I still admire Williams’s
chutzpah, in retrospect I now think it, and my own repeating of it, was mistaken.
My colleague James Boyle points out, too, that the ‘rogue’ states — Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, etc.
— are fundamentally motivated not by pure calculations of power and Realpolitik advantage but by
extremely strong, if repellent, ideologies. What makes a rogue state a rogue is not that it acts purely
according to calculations of obdurate power but the moral quality of its ideology.
Recent biographies of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright appear to confirm that at bottom she is a
believer in supranational institutions — held back by a US Congress and an American people that are not
entirely ready to turn sovereignty and security to the brave new world of supranational institutions, nor
ready to sacrifice American soldiers to their ideals — but eager to be seen as an architect of a new order.
See M. Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth Century Odyssey (1999); A. Blackman, Seasons of Her Life: A
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ought not to be confused with isolationism; they are different.22 I favour antiimperialism.23 But neither the characterization of an instance of US unilateral action
as imperial or anti-imperial, nor the US ability to take unilateral action, is ever free of
the simultaneously enabling ‘mission’ conferred by legitimacy and disabling ‘constraint’ imposed by legitimacy upon power. It is never the mere exercise of power.
What should be said here, then, of imperialism and anti-imperialism, before turning
to the specifics of the international campaign to ban landmines and the US response to
it? I have remarked in passing above that supposed US unilateralism must, at this
point in time, be understood against two categories of imperialisms: the nascent
imperialism of the international legal order, on the one hand, and the ‘really existing
imperialism’, US imperialism, the imperialism of cruise missiles and capital markets,
on the other. They are, in my view, in competition or, at least, in potential competition
with each other.24 The US refusal to join the Ottawa Convention ought to be seen at

22

23

24

Biography of Madeleine Korbel Albright (1998); and the much less objective T. Blood, Madam Secretary: A
Biography of Madeleine Albright (1997). It is in this spirit that the 1999 Kosovo War ought to be seen: for
Albright and the closet supranationalists of the Clinton administration, the Kosovo War gave them the
opportunity to demonstrate the principle of military action for purely humanitarian motives with no
discernible national interest; the problem for the supranationalists, however, was that it was fought not
by supranational institutions or even with their authorization, but instead by the United States,
occasionally assisted by the rest of Nato. For those few US conservatives who supported the Kosovo
intervention, it gave the US the opportunity to fight a war without even pretending to obtain the
authorization of supranational institutions such as the UN or the Security Council, so to denigrate the
authority of such bodies; the problem for these nationalists, however, was that the Kosovo War was not
fought for national interest. The two factions favouring the war in the US made a modest alliance, each
getting something but each giving something up; each represents a brand of imperialism, one
supranationalist imperialism and the other US imperialism.
This is a point lost on Patrick Buchanan, in his new manifesto, P. Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire:
Reclaiming America’s Destiny (1999). The republican sentiment of Buchanan’s title is admirable, but
unfortunately goes no deeper in the book than the title page and is belied by Buchanan’s insistence on
isolationism, nativism, xenophobia, racism, and an anti-immigrant position as conditions for a republic;
those are the conditions for a nation based upon ethnicity, however, rather than the American republic
based on assimilation of immigrants to a common constitutional ideal. A genuine plea for an American
republic, not an empire, is found in the late Walter Karp, The Politics of War (1979), and while it is
scrupulous in its assertion of republican virtue and rejection of American empires abroad, it carries none
of the ugly prejudices to which Buchanan is so attached and with which he so dismayingly tars the
political project of American republicanism.
I briefly discuss these categories of international legal imperialism, US imperialism and anti-imperialism
here in this Part 2. I raise them not in order to set them out fully or defend them in definitive terms, but
merely to sketch the outline of a way of seeing the international world that is an alternative to the usual
manner of international lawyers.
Noam Chomsky almost agrees: ‘On the “nascent imperialism of international legalism and international
institutions”, I almost wish I could agree with you — and was pleased to be able to help define the
framework that defines you as a moderate between the opposed lunatics. My own view is that it would be
a better world, marginally, if international law and institutions could play some role independent of the
manipulations of the great powers, influence varying roughly with power, as expected. But our world is
very different’. Noam Chomsky, e-mail to Kenneth Anderson, 21 October 1999. See also N. Chomsky, The
New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo (1999).
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least partly as a competitive response of one form of imperialism against another, the
‘really existing’ hegemon against a potential rival.25
This is obviously a large and provocative thesis, and my purpose for raising it here is
decidedly not to seek to ‘prove’ it. In some sense, such large ‘views of the world’ as
either ‘liberal internationalism’ or ‘imperialism’ are never really provable as such.
Instead one invites a reader, on the basis of a picture drawn out of the evidence, to
recognize it as a plausible, or more plausible, description of the world, rather than as
proof of it. The evidence is always interpretable in different ways, and ‘plausibility’ is a
more honest goal than ‘proof’. Be that as it may, this discussion will not even attempt
to reach ‘plausibility’; instead it aims simply to alert the reader that a radically
different way of seeing international NGOs, international organizations, and states
sympathetic to the ban campaign, on the one hand, and the US and its refusal to join
the ban, on the other, is at least possible. Obviously I believe there is a great deal of
‘plausibility’ in the alternative, radical description of ‘two competing imperialisms’.26
But I do not necessarily believe that the imperialism thesis is fundamentally
contradictory to the conventional liberal internationalism that is normally applied, by
international public lawyers of a certain internationalist persuasion at least, to the
landmines campaign. It seems to me, as a terminological matter — about which,
again, I will not say more in this discussion — that it is possible to accept that such
movements as the landmines ban campaign are genuinely examples of ‘liberal
internationalism’ — at its best, no less — and yet simultaneously examples of
‘imperialisms’.
Both descriptions, liberal internationalism and ‘competing imperialisms’, are in
some sense true, or at least ‘plausible’, in this matter of the landmines ban.
Comprehending what is implied by each description is critically important, it seems to
me, for understanding simultaneously what the activist course of action should be but
also the limitations that should be considered precisely because the activism is not just
liberalism, but also imperialism, in all its excess, hubris, imposition, and presumption
of its own virtue.27 Liberalism, whether of the internationalist variety or any other, is
often drunk with triumphalism and is rarely capable of seeing the damage it can
25

26

27

The view that the US is an imperialist, interested in preserving its dominance over other sources of power,
and in particular supranational institutions of the UN system, is of course widespread, especially among
the American left. See, e.g., Klare, ‘The Clinton Doctrine’, Nation, 19 April 1999, at 5 (‘the NATO
bombing is part of a larger strategic vision . . . the United States has a vested interest in maintaining
international stability . . . it must be able to act on its own or in conjunction with its most trusted allies
(meaning NATO)’); Editorial, ‘Destroying Kosovo’, Nation, 19 April 1999, at 3 (‘the Administration once
again degraded the UN’s authority and marginalized Security Council members Russia and China’).
I should acknowledge my debt to the 1999 Grotius Lecture by Nathaniel Berman, published as Berman,
‘In the Wake of Empire’, 14 American University International Law Review (1999) 1521.
This methodology, of undertaking (mostly) liberal action while analysing from a radically sceptical
position, in order to reach a synthesized form of action that could best be described as ‘chastened
liberalism’ or ‘liberalism as restrained by the virtue of modesty’, is likely to strike many readers as
exceedingly strange. Obviously it presupposes a problem of liberalism that goes far beyond liberal
internationalism, in that it starts from the proposition that liberalism is a ‘closed’ and ‘complete’
philosophical system which has great difficulty accepting critiques that embody values that are not
themselves valued by liberalism — the standard liberal-communitarian debates come to mind; see, from
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inflict; for that it needs to be seen from a genuinely radical, critical perspective. If I did
not believe something like this, then I would not simultaneously spend the amount of
time I do as an activist on the cause of banning landmines, while writing sharply
critical articles such as this one which aim quite deliberately at radically reinterpreting actions including my own, as a kind of iconic reminder of hubris.28
Four elements (at least) of the method I have briefly sketched above are likely to
strike the confirmed liberal internationalist as preposterous. The first is the proposition
that liberal internationalism and the two competing imperialisms can both be ‘true’ as
descriptions of the landmines ban campaign and the US response. Rather, says the
liberal internationalist, they would appear to be disjunctive if not exhaustively
disjunctive explanations, such that if you accept one you must reject the other. Be a
liberal or be a radical, but do not believe you can commune in both churches at once.
The second is the suggestion that there is any utility in considering radical critiques
of actions or campaigns or anything else that arise or, loosely speaking, ‘derive’ from
liberal internationalism. Rather, says the liberal, liberal internationalism is ‘complete’
as a model of ethical international order, and no genuine understanding results from
examining its actions from radical perspectives. The claim of liberal hubris is therefore
simply misplaced, because there is no genuinely ‘true’ radical perspective from which
to perceive this alleged hubris and it therefore cannot constitute hubris. There is no
imperialism at least in the actions of the international NGOs, international
organizations, and sympathetic states in support of the ban campaign (although the
US actions are another matter); their actions are just plain old liberalism.
The third is the claim that there is anything to the idea of ‘two competing
imperialisms’. Whatever limitations liberal internationalism may have, says the
liberal, whatever ‘modesty’ it ought to exhibit in its claims to have an ethical plan of
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the voluminous literature, J.B. Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics (1995). The presumption of
completeness leads liberalism to a hubristic self-confidence in its actions and social prescriptions, and an
unwillingness to see the possibility of, for example, dialectically bad consequences and social costs
deriving from its social programme. The ‘chastened’ or ‘modest’ liberal, who understands the tendency to
hubris inherent in liberalism, attempts to take radical critiques — which of course can vary hugely and be
contradictory as between themselves — even incoherently into what might still remain, fundamentally,
a liberal plan of action. I discuss the idea of liberalism’s presumption of ‘completeness’ briefly in an essay
on the late Christopher Lasch, in Anderson, ‘Heartless World Revisited: Christopher Lasch’s Parting
Polemic Against the New Class’, Times Literary Supplement (London), 22 September 1995; and in
Anderson, ‘Review Essay: A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk’, 96 Columbia Law
Review (1996) 1062, at 1081–1092. The idea is briefly applied with respect to liberal internationalism in
Anderson, ‘Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the
United States’, 33 Virginia Journal of International Law (1993) 385. I do not suppose that those who really
are smitten with liberal internationalism will find this very persuasive, since they are not likely to see that
there is even the risk of a problem of liberal immodesty.
As a method of social action and social criticism, I take at least some comfort from M. Walzer, The
Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century (1988), which argues
that something like the tension I suggest must be maintained between radical critique and suitably
chastened liberal action; likewise, too, albeit in the much more dramatic circumstances of the French
Resistance, the poetic notebook of Rene Char, Feuillet d’Hypnos (1946), especially the section
‘France-of-the-caverns’, dedicated (not unsurprisingly) to Albert Camus.
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international action, the claim of ‘two competing imperialisms’ as an alternative,
radical vision of the landmines campaign and the US response to it is unpersuasive on
its own. It is internally incoherent as a description, even accepting the possibility of an
analysis based on imperialism.
The fourth arises from the third, and is the view denying that there could even be
such a thing as ‘international legal imperialism’. There is, to be sure, US imperialism;
it is a fact of international life. But international law is the non-imperial alternative to
US imperialism and hegemony, and it ought to be celebrated as such.29
This is not the place to undertake a response to each of these objections. I have
raised the possibility of an alternative vision of how such apparently benign and
virtuous things as the landmines campaign might be construed, the possibility of
locating it and the US response within an framework of imperialism, because I think
that my observations in the remainder of the discussion would be entirely (rather than
merely mostly) puzzling to the international lawyers who are likely to be this article’s
readership without at least some sense of how far from liberal internationalism this
critique resides. This may be taken by readers as simply another reason to dismiss it as
pointless. To that I would ask that those readers who are part of the collegium of
international law, and who tend to accept the standard ‘master narrative’ of liberal
international law undertake, insofar as possible, in order to glean something from the
subsequent discussion of international NGOs and the US response, to invoke some
principle of intellectual charity at least while reading this.
Still, one last thing needs mentioning before proceeding onwards to an iconoclastic
account of the international NGO movement and the campaign to ban landmines.
Even among those exercising an admirable amount of intellectual charity in the
course of reading this article may still wonder what could conceivably be meant by
describing the enterprise of international law as I have described it, as international
legal imperialism. A wide part of educated opinion in Europe, particularly in France,
regards US actions on many matters as the exercise of illegitimate hegemony, which I
29

It also seems to me that however wild, even paranoid, the view might seem to some that the international
legal order could be seen as ‘imperialist’, this pales beside the fantastically strong assertions by President
Chirac, supra note 17, as to the totalizing nature of US imperialism, running all the way from military
strength to financial dominance to linguistic and cultural hegemony. Chirac’s vision — widely shared,
so far as I can tell, among European intellectuals of all varieties — is one of a seemingly seamless web of
US imperialism, which must be resisted even when, in the case of language and culture, it scarcely seems
to be the ‘programme’ of the United States government that is causing a movement to globalism on
American cultural terms but instead the liberal, autonomous choices of individuals worldwide. I am no
friend of imperialism, whether US imperialism or any other, but once Chirac goes beyond those matters
which are more or less within control of government policy, such as military deployments and, to a lesser
extent, finance and capital, to such things as language and culture, then Chirac is confusing
‘imperialism’, as a theory and means of ‘governing’, with shifting tectonic plates of global culture;
appealing to such concepts as imperialism and hegemony loses its bite, because analysis is no longer tied
in any strict ways to the policies of a government but attributed, much less usefully, to America as such. It
is too broad an attribution to mean very much, whereas denouncing the US missile attack on Sudan, for
example, as the rash and unjustified act of an imperial and hegemonic aggressor seems to me both correct
and meaningful. In any case, Chirac has the admirable honesty to inform us that the point of both the
institutions of Europe and the institutions of the UN is to stand against the hegemony of the United States.
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take to be not unrelated to imperialism.30 But is international law not being invoked,
by the Europeans in particular, as a means to resist, at least at the rhetorical level,
American imperialism? How is it that it can be described as its own form of ‘competing
imperialism’?31
But of course there is no reason why an empire cannot be founded on law and
legalism, and there is likewise no reason that it cannot, according to both its own
lights and some broader standard of moral judgement, be benevolent.32 What makes
an empire an ‘empire’, and imperialism ‘imperialism’, is neither its legal formalism nor
its benevolence, but its imposition from above and from without — geographically,
culturally, politically and economically.33 Imperialism depends neither upon consent
of the governed nor upon democratic assent for its assertion of political legitimacy; it
can depend upon numerous other principles of legitimacy, ranging from economic
necessity34 to the ‘white man’s burden’ to the promulgation of the faith. Most
frequently invoked in today’s world by those willing to call directly for an imperial
order at the level of the United Nations, in the form of protectorates and mandates to
govern in places of massive human rights abuse, the aftermath of war, or the so-called
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See my earlier footnotes regarding President Chirac’s 4 November 1999 speech laying out this view.
There is no need here to take a position on whether and to what degree imperialism ‘must’ be driven by
economic, rather than political, factors — the classic 20th century debate largely between Marxists and
liberal thinkers. I am happy to accept that imperialism often has no special relation to capital, let alone to
Rudolf Hilferding’s category of ‘finance capital’ (R. Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of
Capitalist Development (orig. 1910), ed. T. Bottomore (1985)), and to accept Hans J. Morgenthau’s
decidedly non-Marxist, classically ‘neutralist’ definition of it as a ‘policy that aims at the overthrow of the
status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more nations’. H.J. Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (1966), at 42. Morgenthau’s definition — in
some sense a modern expression of Augustine’s concept of animus dominandi (see Elshtain, supra note 27,
at 93–94) — seems to capture the imperial essence of, for example, the Chirac project quite nicely; that it
is an imperialism in opposition to another imperialism, US imperialism, seems neither here nor there. Of
course, not all the visions of supranational institutions conform to Chirac’s, but the assumption that they
should take power and carry legitimacy in the world away from existing sovereign states, whether the
United States or others, seems to me amply to fill Morgenthau’s carefully non-ideological definition.
A standard undergraduate textbook on international relations, after all, deliberately associates
‘imperialism’ as being ‘invoked proudly to imply what Britain had contributed toward civilizing the parts
of the world once or still controlled by Britain — the rule of law, parliamentary institutions, a rational
administration of civil servants with some sense of public responsibility (hitherto a rather rare
phenomenon in many regions), and a conviction of the worth and rights of human beings’. J.E.
Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,
3rd ed. (1990), at 227. All that, one might say, and still, unapologetically imperialist.
I take this to be in conformity with Morgenthau’s standard definition, supra note 31.
This is the famous analysis promulgated by John A. Hobson (Imperialism: A Study (orig. 1902) (1965)),
V.I. Lenin (Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1939)), and Rudolf Hilferding, supra note 31. As
Lenin put it in the standard Marxist–Leninist view: ‘Imperialism is capitalism in the stage of development
in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of
capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international
thrusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers
has been completed’, at 89.
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‘failed states’, is that there is no other choice — a sort of negative invocation of the
benevolence principle.35
There may genuinely be no choice in some of these cases. But consent of the
governed is still lacking, democratic legitimacy in the long run is still lacking, and
anyone who believes that those deficits do not produce their own pathologies over the
long term — and frequently short term — would do well to review the history of a wide
variety of contemporary benevolent protectorates, starting with Somalia and Haiti.36
Of still greater concern than the situations of genuine protectorates and failed states,
however, is the broadly held perception, particularly among liberal internationalists,
that if not the UN system in precisely its present form, then some form of emergent
global order really does have legitimacy notwithstanding its notable — and in my
view, insurmountable — democratic deficits. It has instead, apparently, the
legitimacy of international law, and there is a certain sense of ‘ships passing in the
night’ if one attempts to ask what, precisely, gives international law this legitimacy.37
We count democratic legitimacy to be the sin qua non of legitimacy of the sovereign
national state, but why, I wonder, do we suddenly jettison it when it comes to the
international system — for no better reason, so far as I can tell, than that it really
cannot be achieved?38
35

36
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Indeed, the rehabilitation of the very word ‘imperialism’ within at least First World countries and their
liberal internationalist elites is a striking phenomenon. For an important historical analysis of the
evolution of the term, see R. Koebner and H.D. Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political
Word (1964). The journalist David Rieff, for example, is happy to describe himself as an imperialist,
although he does not shy away from an understanding of the bad consequences that also arise from it.
A useful place to begin, notwithstanding that I disagree almost entirely with its conclusions and outlook,
is M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (1998); she recognizes plainly, as Alex
de Waal put it in an excellent review (Waal, ‘We Do Deserts, We Don’t Do Mountains’, London Review of
Books, 11 November 1999, at 17, 19), that in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, and by extension other
places as well, ‘international engagement . . . is profound and will be long-lasting, and thus . . .
imperial-style responsibilities should be taken seriously’. See also J. Coulon, Soldiers of Diplomacy: The
United Nations, Peacekeeping and the New World Order (1998); and Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices:
Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (1998).
For many international lawyers, especially academics, there is a certain weariness in taking up this
question, a certain desire to say, ‘Haven’t we long since settled this?’ To which the appropriate response
is, ‘Well, yes, you settled this among yourselves to your international lawyerly satisfaction, imagining
that no one else mattered to reaching this agreement, and now you seem surprised when the rest of us
don’t feel bound by the agreements and understandings you worked out within your hermetically closed
circles.’
I take up this question in an aggressively polemical fashion in Anderson, ‘Secular Eschatologies of the
Internationalized New Class’, in P. Juviler and C. Gustafson (eds), Religion and Human Rights: Competing
Claims? (1998), at 107. The reliably sanctimonious Michael Ignatieff, reviewing the article in the New
York Review of Books (Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis’, New York Review of Books, 20 May
1999), seemed to conclude that it was a question beneath answering, and offered platitudes that because
the human rights movement stands with victims (as Human Rights Watch asserts as its motto), it cannot
have democratic deficits. This does not seem to me to be a serious argument; it is, however, a
confirmation that liberalism is a closed system that has the gravest difficulties hearing its critics or even
acknowledging that there might be grounds of criticism. A genuinely thoughtful — sometimes
sympathetic and sometimes critical — response is made by José Alvarez in his concluding remarks to the
University of Michigan conference at which this paper was originally delivered; he notes, by way of
criticism, that I have a tendency to romanticize democracy, especially within sovereign states, and to

104

EJIL 11 (2000), 91–120

This assertion of the legitimacy and supremacy of international law over sovereign
states does seem to me to fill the requirements of imperialism quite nicely. That it has
not yet got very far in the teeth of US hegemony is neither here nor there; that it is
opposed to, in my view, an equally illegitimate US imperialism does not seem to me to
make it any less imperial in its pretensions. What it is about, what it aims for, what its
adherents (including many readers of this article) fervently yearn for as idealists,
people of good will, liberal internationalists, is the establishment of an international
system that is genuinely constitutionally supreme with respect to both nation states
and the people that, in the best of cases, they democratically represent. In no very
radical sense, it seems to me the quintessence of empire. And it is in this sense, as a
partisan of democratic legitimacy, that I call it ‘international legal imperialism’.

3 The Romance Between NGOs and International
Organizations
A Seven Lessons from the Landmines Ban Campaign
Although the history of the Ottawa Convention is still largely oral history, one
indispensable written source has emerged, To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement
to Ban Landmines.39 Edited by two Canadian academics, Maxwell A. Cameron and
Brian W. Tomlin, and a Canadian diplomat extremely active in the international
campaign, Robert J. Lawson, its collected papers, drawn from a range of NGO activists,
academics, and others, are the first serious effort to record the history of the landmines
ban campaign and assess its impact upon the rest of international law and
lawmaking. Drawing from this book and my own experience, a series of observations
about the ban campaign stand out.
First, the international campaign to ban landmines began entirely — one hesitates
to use so strong a word, but in this case it is applicable — as an effort of international
NGOs.40 The initial steps began with the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC); its surgeon staff particularly, alarmed at the sharp increase during the 1980s
in the number of landmine victim limb amputations, persuaded the ICRC to raise the
issue in its diplomatic, legal and public awareness efforts.41 The ICRC would be the first
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genuflect before it even where, under other circumstances – viz., where I did not need it as a category to
stand against the evils of supranational imperialism – I might have doubted that it had very much
‘democratic’ legitimacy at all. (Alvarez, ‘Multilateralism and its Discontents’, 2 EJIL (2000) forthcoming.) I acknowledge that Alvarez has identified a matter of serious concern in my own analysis; I do
not think it is fatal to the analysis, but it is serious indeed.
M.A. Cameron, R.J. Lawson, and B.W. Tomlin (eds), To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban
Landmines (1998).
In this account of the background history of the campaign, I draw heavily from my own experience, but
also from the very important historical account given in Williams and Goose, ‘The International
Campaign to Ban Landmines’, in ibid. at 20.
See ICRC, Landmines Ban Brochure (1992).

The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines

105

to admit that its nascent campaign had comparatively minimal visibility until a
coalition of international NGOs with concerns about landmines arising from very
different standpoints, came together to initiate what later became known as the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).42 The initial groups, which had
met in various ways and combinations in the run up to the formal launch of the
international campaign at a meeting at the offices of Human Rights Watch in New
York in 1992, were Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (US),
Medico International (Germany), Mines Awareness Group (UK), Physicians for
Human Rights (US), and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (US), which
became the first ICBL steering committee.43
The ICBL expanded over the next few years to number more than 1,200 NGOs in
some 60 countries;44 although the ICRC, for reasons of its mandate, did not formally
join the ICBL coalition, it and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their
federation fully supported the process leading up to the Ottawa Convention.45 It was a
striking part of the campaign that diverse NGOs could find bases on which to support
the ban campaign drawing upon their own organizational mandates. Thus, for
example, Human Rights Watch and the ICRC regarded landmines as a human rights
and humanitarian law issue, while such groups as Medico International, Physicians
for Human Rights, or Handicap International saw it as a medical and public health
issue, while still others, such as the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation saw it as
a matter of dealing with the consequences of war in a social and developmental sense.
Second, governments were initially entirely uninterested; it was regarded by
governments everywhere as pie-in-the-sky, even if they were not actively hostile to
the idea. Governments regarded the only real possibility as being a strengthening of
the existing Landmines Protocol, so-called Protocol II to the Convention on
Conventional Weapons;46 the ICBL had long since concluded that amendments to
Protocol II, governing the rules for the ‘proper’ use of landmines, were useless.47 At the
same time, while governments were generally unpersuaded as to the idea of a
42
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Cognescenti of the history of ban campaign will see that I am here deliberately stepping aside from some
unproductive debates over which NGOs ‘really started’ the ban campaign; together with some ugly
squabbles over the 1997 Nobel Prize awarded jointly to the long-time coordinator of the ICBL, Jody
Williams, and to the ICBL itself, these arguments have wasted considerable time — although perhaps
they are inevitable in a campaign organized deliberately on a loose and ad hoc basis in order to have
maximum flexibility of action. With some trepidation, as many of the parties involved have vehemently
disagreed with the article, see T. Marshall, ‘Nobel Prize Sets Off a Landmine’, Los Angeles Times, 6
February 1998, at 1.
This meeting is described at Williams and Goose, supra note 40, at 22.
Ibid.
See generally Maslen, ‘The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, in To Walk Without
Fear, supra note 39, at 80. One influential sector of the international NGO community which never really
joined the coalition — somewhat surprisingly, to my mind — was international environmentalism, for
example such organizations as Greenpeace; these groups never really decided to see the litter of
landmines as, for example, a form of ‘pollution’ or some other form of attack upon the environment.
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and other Devices, UNGA Doc
A/Conf. 95/15 and Corr. 1–5; 19 I.L.M. 1534 (1980).
Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (1993), at 261–306.
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universal, comprehensive ban treaty, some sympathetic governments and legislatures, at the instigation of local NGOs affiliated with the ICBL, began to pass
unilateral restrictions of their own on landmines, including restrictions on institutions and companies under their jurisdiction, ranging from prohibitions on use by
their own militaries to export bans directed against arms manufacturers.48
Third, the ban campaign had a simple, easily understood message — a complete
and comprehensive ban, nothing more, nothing less. The message was so simple that
it could fit whole into an advertisement or public awareness message. I was once
asked, for example, to provide the text of a model landmines ban treaty for the ICBL;
after due consideration, the text read in full:
States parties to this Convention undertake never under any circumstances to produce,
stockpile, transfer, or use antipersonnel landmines, and further undertake within a five year
period upon ratification of this Convention to destroy all existing stockpiles of antipersonnel
landmines.49

Although the final Ottawa Convention is of course longer and more detailed, in
contrast to other arms control or humanitarian law treaties it preserves the spirit of
transparent language and clear, uncompromising and unambiguous undertakings.
This utter moral and political clarity was an integral part of the campaign in reaching
various publics.
Fourth, although the possibility of banning landmines was seen strongly as a threat
— if not complete nonsense, at the outset — to the world’s militaries, it did not
represent an overwhelming economic threat to arms makers. Anti-personnel
landmines represented then, and more so now, a very modest part of the munitions
sector of arms manufacturers.50 Giving up mines manufacture did not represent a
significant blow to the profitability of diversified defence contractors.51 As a
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These early efforts are catalogued in Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A
Deadly Legacy (1993). Nearly all these efforts drew on the example of a US senator, Patrick Leahy, who,
together with Congressman Lane Evans, had been pursuing the matter legislatively in the United States
almost singlehandedly — and with striking success even before the ICBL existed, having produced
unilateral US moratoria on landmines’ export over several years prior to the creation of the ICBL.
Ironically, part of the success of Leahy and Evans’ efforts lay in the very invisibility of the effort; the US
military did not feel especially threatened by these efforts, and certainly favoured strengthening
prohibitions on the ‘proper’ use of mines, until ban efforts crystallized and went public in the form of the
comprehensive ban treaty. But it was an important part of the development of the campaign that ban
advocates in a wide range of Nato countries were able to say to their legislatures and militaries, ‘if the
United States can ban mine exports, then surely we can too’.
Author’s files, 1993.
See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-free World
(1999), at 5–12, for the best current survey of the production and stockpiling of landmines. This is true
for arms manufacturers in the aggregate notwithstanding the bankruptcy of a major Western producer
of mines — the Italian Valsella company. See 13 Jane’s Defence Weekly (1997) 11, 1 October.
For a time in 1993, George Soros, the financier and philanthropist, happened to hold the third largest
share stake in Alliant Tech Systems, an American munitions manufacturer that produces landmines for
the US military. On account of that connection, I was able to hold discussions with certain senior
corporate officers at Alliant Tech, who told me informally that landmines were not a major part of
Alliant’s line of corporate products or corporate profits.
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consequence, no industrial or private sector groups had a strong incentive within the
Nato countries to contribute money to a counter-campaign. The opposition to the
treaty was entirely a matter of governmental policy, making that policy considerably
more susceptible to public pressure by NGOs. Militaries might be opposed to the ban,
but the military-industrial complex, so to speak, was not engaged on the issue.
Fifth, the treaty process represented a new approach to international lawmaking
because — largely in response to international NGO pressures — once a core of
influential governments had endorsed the ban treaty, the negotiating principle was
not the usual method of arms control treaty negotiation on the principle of obtaining
consensus on each point along the way, no matter how much the treaty had to be
watered down or how long it took.52 Instead, again on account of international NGO
pressures, sympathetic governments adopted a new principle of negotiating a treaty
among ‘like-minded’ states — in effect, accepting the comprehensiveness of the
international NGO position and its refusal to compromise the essentials of the
landmines ban. The wager, of course, of negotiating a treaty among the like-minded
alone (even though the club of the like-minded has eventually grown to include
numerically the vast majority of states) was (and is) that the treaty will eventually
gain adherence even from those who were not in the beginning like-minded.53
Sixth, governments eventually began to come on board the landmines ban cause
for three principal reasons. NGO pressure, first, brought them to an awareness of the
genuine extent of the problem and put it on their policy agendas. Many governments
recognized, second, that for them the decision to ban landmines was essentially cost
and risk-free; it was unlikely if not unthinkable that they would fight any wars, let
alone wars requiring mines. In any case, many of the European states favouring the
ban knew (as members of Nato which had, the alliance notwithstanding, decisively
disarmed themselves during the course of the 1990s) that should the unlikely
moment of war appear, the United States would fight it, as occurred in Kosovo,
because only the US would have the weapons and troops.54 Finally, numbers of the
medium-sized powers, including the Nordic countries and such lesser Nato powers as
Canada, came to see the campaign to ban landmines as an important counterweight
to the political hegemony of the United States; they perceived an alliance with
international NGOs as providing ideological pressure against not only America’s
material advantages as the world’s superpower, but against its assertion of moral and
political legitimacy in setting the terms of such things as the use of landmines not
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This can be contrasted with the usual approach of disarmament treaties such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention, each of which was many years in negotiations and
discussions.
As of this writing, 11 November 1999, the Ottawa Convention has garnered 136 signatories and
accessions, and 89 ratifications. A convenient, if unofficial, way of checking on signature and
ratifications is to consult www.mines.gc.ca
See John R. Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute, Testimony Before the House
International Relations European Defense Subcommittee, 12 November 1999, for a useful discussion of
the US, Nato and Europe on defence issues.
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around the brutal facts of Angola and Cambodia, but instead around the US military’s
war-fighting doctrines in the Korean peninsula.55 Resentment of US hegemony should
not be overlooked as at least a residual reason for participation in the campaign. As
the editors of To Walk Without Fear expressed it, ‘... small and medium-sized states can,
in partnership with global civil society, overcome great power opposition; the US does
not always have to lead in the new post-Cold War environment.’56
Seventh, and the most far-reaching in its implications, the ban campaign by its end
stages was conceived by sympathetic governments, United Nations institutions, and
the international NGO movement as being a genuine partnership between NGOs,
international organizations and sympathetic states — between, so to speak, public
and private. The ‘Ottawa process’, so called — the diplomatic and international NGO
processes leading up to the December 1997 treaty-signing ceremonies in Ottawa —
reflected a decision by the Canadian government, among others, to put very
significant resources and prestige behind the ban campaign.57 The famous press
conference held at the end of the critical December 1996 Ottawa planning meeting,
including parallel meetings of NGOs and states, at which the Canadian foreign
minister, Lloyd Axworthy, made the surprise, radical announcement that Canada
would hold a treaty signing ceremony a mere year later, electrified the activist world.
But it also, to a remarkable extent, electrified the sympathetic diplomatic and
international organization worlds as well — and, not insignificantly, infuriated the
American delegation, which had not been warned in advance, although the NGO
activists had been notified to orchestrate a ‘spontaneous’ standing ovation.58 Yet that
event was preceded by numerous smaller, regional conferences designed to build
support for the treaty; in these conferences the model was the same partnership of
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See the earlier references to Chirac’s 4 November 1999 speech and accompanying discussion.
Cameron et al., supra note 39, at 13. To assert that the landmines campaign has ‘overcome’ great power
opposition is, however, surely illusory; more accurate would be to say that it has ignored the failure of the
United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and others to join the Ottawa Convention. Whether
the wager that the like-minded states can persuade the unlike-minded to join at some point is a wager —
and one which I have always favoured taking — but it is wishful thinking, the effect of focusing on the
formality of the Ottawa Convention, a mere piece of paper, rather than on the goal it merely serves, to ban
landmines, to speak of overcoming that which has as yet barely been confronted. The Ottawa Convention
is a great achievement, but it is, frankly, the childishness of small and weak states to think that tweaking
the noses of the great powers by signing a treaty opposed by those powers means ‘overcoming’ them.
See Tomlin, ‘On a Fast Track to a Ban: The Canadian Policy Process’, in To Walk Without Fear, supra note
39, at 185. It needs to be understood that the so-called Ottawa Process was a term coined by diplomats to
describe the events between the planning meeting in Ottawa in December 1996, when Canada publicly
committed itself to signing a ban treaty a year later, and the treaty signing in Ottawa in December 1997,
including several preparatory drafting sessions, the most important of which took place in Oslo in
September 1997. It was a critical period for the campaign; however, the international campaign had
been underway since 1992, long before the Ottawa Process existed.
For a description of the event, see Cameron, ‘Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a
Model’, in To Walk Without Fear, supra note 39, at 438; see generally Tomlin, ‘On a Fast Track to a Ban:
The Canadian Policy Process’, in To Walk Without Fear, supra note 39, at 185.
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states and NGOs, holding meetings in parallel in such places as Mozambique and
Cambodia. In effect, international NGOs and the core ban states had decided that they
had much to gain in pursuit of the common goal of a ban by leveraging off one
another.

B The Partnership Between ‘International Civil Society’, Sympathetic
States, and International Organizations
This partnership between international NGOs, on the one hand, and sympathetic
states and international organizations, on the other, bears closer examination,
because it is regarded as a principal, if indeed not the principal, legacy of the landmines
campaign, and the central element in the new template envisioned for international
law-making.59 Most of the writers in To Walk Without Fear hail this belief fervently,
and it is today widely and equally fervently hailed by the international activist
community, as well as by the policy makers of sympathetic governments and
international organizations. The ban campaign and its forging of a partnership
between international public institutions, including sympathetic states, and international civil society, so-called, is the model of a new and better way of creating
international law. As Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy put it:
The need for new partnerships to address global problems and the increased power wielded by a
wide range of state and non-state actors intersected in the landmines campaign ... it brought
together a mixed group of players into a coalition without precedent... The landmines
campaign was the harbinger of the new multilateralism: new alliances among states, new
partnerships with non-state actors, and new approaches to international governance.60

And indeed, several international campaigns are now underway drawn largely
from this model — the Rome Statute process toward the ICC, the campaign
spearheaded by the ICRC and Human Rights Watch to ban blinding laser weapons,
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This extends even to a disturbing trend, which is the growing dependence of the international NGO
campaign on funding from sympathetic states, such as Canada, to continue the vital post-Ottawa
Convention work of monitoring compliance with the treaty. Until recently, and certainly in terms of
overall dollars contributed, the only non-state funder of the Landmine Monitor — envisioned as the
primary report annually monitoring treaty compliance — has been the Open Society Institute Landmine
Project, which has given several hundred thousand dollars in support of Landmine Monitor directly and
to Human Rights Watch to support that work. But the Open Society Institute Landmine Project — I am a
member of its advisory board, which makes decisions regarding funding from its approximately $1
million a year — is gradually going out of business, and it is possible that no other private donors will step
in to take its place, at least not in significant amounts. The picture that this paints is quite a different one
from international NGOs working in ‘partnership’ with sympathetic states and international organizations; instead, it paints the disturbing possibility of international NGOs working as grantees and
subcontractors for states from whom they receive all their funding. Over time this would likely severely
hamper the independence of the international NGOs and be a most unfortunate outcome. See Economist
(US edition), NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, 29 January 2000, at 25–27.
Axworthy, ‘Towards a New Multilateralism’, in To Walk Without Fear, supra note 39, at 452–453.
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and the rapidly growing campaign against the use of child soldiers, among prominent
examples.61 As Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, has put it:
The landmines campaign ... can be seen as a model of what is to come ... already the focus has
shifted forward, with NGOs looking to build similar partnerships with small and medium-sized
governments on other causes.62

The template has certain key assumptions, however, few of which have been
critically examined.
The central assumption underlying the idea that the landmines campaign is a new
and better way of doing international lawmaking is that international NGOs are
somehow ‘international civil society’. The conceptual essence of this phrase is that
international NGOs are somehow the international equivalent of what, within a
single society, social and political theorists have long called ‘civil society’.63 If that is
so, then international NGOs are a species of ‘intermediate’ institution — neither state
nor international organization, yet neither market nor private business enterprise.
They are instead the so-called ‘Third Sector’ — voluntary civic and citizens’
organizations, the international equivalent, apparently, of domestic society’s
churches, civil liberties organizations, service clubs, literacy volunteers, and all the
structures of volunteerism that are so celebrated in Western democracies nowadays.64
As a consequence, according to the editors of To Walk Without Fear:
61
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See post-conference notes to the Conference on Child Soldiers, Washington College of Law, American
University, Washington DC, April 1998. The model for organizing is nearly the same in each case, and
indeed the international NGO actors and staff are often the same; e.g. Human Rights Watch has taken a
lead role in each, and Stuart Maslen, who worked for Unicef on landmines, has become the coordinator of
the international NGO child soldier campaign. See also, for a critical commentary on the child soldiers
campaign, Ralph Peters, ‘Sometimes It Takes a Child to Raze a Village’, Wall Street Journal, 1 February
2000, opinion page.
Roth, ‘New Minefields for NGOs: After the War on Landmines, These Organizations Started New
Campaigns’, Nation, 13 April 1998, at 22.
For an exceedingly uncritical, indeed celebratory statement of the new ‘international civil society’
ideology, see Shaw, ‘Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach’, 3
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1994) 650.
Scholarly literature on the concept of ‘civil society’ fills libraries; it is highly contested terrain, as a
political, historical, and sociological matter. Rather than enter that (important) debate here, I will simply
refer the reader to three general source books and their accompanying bibliographies: J.A. Hall (ed.) Civil
Society: Theory, History, Comparison (1995); J.L. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory
(1992); and John Keane (ed.) Civil Society and the State (1988). The international activists, bureaucrats,
and diplomats who so freely use the term these days have in mind one central idea in an otherwise largely
uninformed use of the term: they mean organizations which are neither private business enterprise nor
organizations of the state or international public institutions — NGOs, in other words. It perhaps bears
noting, at least, that this is not how Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, Hobbes, Locke, Hegel or Marx would
have understood the term; perhaps de Tocqueville would have, but perhaps not. See e.g. M.B. Becker, The
Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century: A Privileged Moment in the History of England, Scotland,
and France (1994). Does its pedigree matter, when its users seem generally too ignorant of its origins to
have adopted it from any specific historical tradition? Possibly not, but on the other hand it may say
something about the shallowness of the liberalism endorsed by default, as it were, by partisans of liberal
internationalism –– a liberalism without roots deeper than the past several decades, bearing the many
flaws of a specifically American rights-based liberalism, of the kind criticized by John Gray in Gray,
Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (1995) and especially his essay in
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Governments working together with global civil society can achieve diplomatic results far
beyond what might have been possible in the Cold War era... The emergence of global civil
society holds the promise of making existing international institutions more democratic,
transforming them through innovation and experimentation, and anchoring them in world
opinion.65

International NGOs, because they are ‘international civil society’, are therefore a
force for democratizing international relations and international institutions and,
moreover, the authoritative bearers of ‘world opinion’. They are therefore the
legitimate representatives in the international sphere of ‘people’ in the world, in a way
in which their states, even democratic states, and their state representatives, are not.
International NGOs therefore have authenticity, legitimacy and authority of the
‘people’ of the world in a way that states and international organizations do not, and
therefore ought to have a seat at the table of power. As Foreign Minister Axworthy put
it in an address to NGOs in the midst of the Ottawa process:
One can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles in this process. They are
now part of the way decisions have to be made. They have been the voice saying that
government belongs to the people, and must respond to the people’s hopes, demands and
ideals.66

Thus, international NGOs are ‘international civil society’, international civil society
is the voice of the people of the globe, the voice of ‘world opinion’, and so states and
international organizations must make a place for these NGOs at the negotiating
tables, in the halls of power, because if they do not, these states — even, once again,
democratic ones — and international institutions risk illegitimacy. Or as Maxwell A.
Cameron puts it:
The Ottawa Process democratized foreign policy within the framework of existing representative institutions by using a partnership with civil society to expose policy to the test of
publicity... The public diplomacy practised in the Ottawa Process compelled policy-makers to
provide public reasons for their actions and exposed them to criticism from civil society by
bringing an NGO coalition into the policy process, both as domestic partners and international
allies.67

65
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67

the Times Literary Supplement (London) 28 April 195, at 28:
‘. . . Americocentric liberalism has little, if any, salience in other parts of the world where the poltical
agenda is governed not by individualist conceptions of law and rights but by the need to work out terms of
peaceful coexistence among different communities’.
Cameron et al., supra note 39, at p. 13.
Axworthy, ‘Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the
Oslo NGO Forum on Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines’, DFAIT (Canada) Statement, Oslo, 10
September 1997.
Cameron, supra note 58, at 441–443. One important weakness in much of To Walk Without Fear,
including Cameron’s, is that, being a Canadian book, funded partly by the Canadian government, and
having largely Canadian contributors, its articles very often fail to distinguish between the actions and,
indeed, legitimacy of civil society within Canada and those of international NGOs acting in the world at
large. It is a measure of just how unreflective is the extension of civil society by metaphor from particular
societies to the planet at large that these contributors, including Cameron, fail even to discuss the
possibility that the authenticity of the public voice brought by institutions of civil society within Canada
upon the Canadian government simply has no correlate in the international world, because all the world
is not a ‘society’.
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The seriousness with which states took the view that the NGOs were both the voice
of world opinion as well as necessarily their partners was reflected in the number of
state delegations which had even appointed staff of international NGOs as members to
their delegations. In some cases that meant that some countries essentially handed
their policy and negotiating apparatus to activists; in other cases, the government had
its own line, usually sympathetic but not identical to the NGO position, but allowed
the NGO inside access to the negotiations. And the Oslo drafting sessions, which
developed the draft treaty itself, allowed not only the ICRC access in its traditional
observer role — with rights of intervention and to be heard — but granted the same to
the ICBL. And why not, since the negotiations took place not under the aegis of the
United Nations or some other agglomeration of all states, but instead merely as a
group of like-minded countries that could set any rules of participation they liked. It is
an approach that has gained momentum in other spheres, including the process of
negotiating the Rome Statute; the moment of ‘international civil society’ has
apparently come, at least within the imperium of international legalism.

C But Who Elected the International NGOs?68
Perhaps the point at which to commence a critique of this apparent victory of
democracy through international civil society is to ask why international bureaucrats, for example, those who work for international organizations, have become so
eager in recent years to embrace the language of international civil society? One can
scarcely attend a meeting of international elites of one kind or another at which an
international civil servant speaks these days without hearing, no matter what the
topic, a sort of adulatorio to NGOs, a hymn of thanksgiving for ‘international civil
society’ and how it is making international bureaucracy more accountable and
effective. As one who has always worked from the NGO side of all things international,
I can report what we all know, that it was not always this way. Why this shift? And
why now?
It would be pleasant to think that the reason is that international bureaucracy has
woken up to the fact of the effectiveness of the international NGO sector; it has come
round to understand that public international organizations, like governments, are
not very effective at the rapid and efficient provision of broad ranges of services. The
dawning of a genuine humility — and not merely passivity — of international
organizations, and a concomitant willingness to work with partners who may or may
not have the credentials of states, may not be international civil servants or diplomats
or anything else official, and certainly do not have the pension plans of international
civil servants — well, this would all be to the good. And no doubt this is part of the
explanation, especially in the changes of hearts and minds of many in international
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This entire section, including the title, owes a great deal to David Rieff, both conversations over many
years and to his recent essay, David Rieff, ‘The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights’, New York Times
Magazine, 8 August 1999, Section 6, at 36. This is not to suggest, however, that he agrees with all of it;
Rieff, to start with, is an unapologetic imperialist.
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bureaucracies to understand that international NGOs are not, per se, their enemy or,
worse, simply irrelevant. No one believes they are irrelevant any more.
Still, it seems to me unlikely that this is the whole explanation. For one thing, this
praise is nearly always, in my experience, offered within the very specific ideological
language of ‘civil society’. It is not merely pragmatic praise for non-governmental
agencies and their performance; it is praise of a theory of politics framed within the
terms of a discourse of politics, taken more or less directly out of the theoretical
literature of ‘social movements’ and ‘civil society’.69 It is scarcely necessary to adopt so
wholeheartedly the whole theoretical apparatus of the Third Sector, the ‘independent
sector’, a theory that is fundamentally about the democratic legitimacy of international NGOs, merely in order to praise their good works. But adopt it the
international bureaucracy has.
And an important reason why the bureaucracy has adopted this theory of politics,
of the legitimacy of the independent international NGO sector — long less resisted
than ignored, treated as gadflies and irritants — is that public international
organizations themselves are in desperate need of legitimacy. That is what they look to
international NGOs to provide for them. But of course, this is to ask, why a crisis of
legitimacy for public international organizations now, let alone the further question of
how it is that international NGOs can help provide them legitimacy? The simplest
answer, it appears, is that with the end of the Cold War, with the unfolding of
globalization — including the formation of international elites across sectors of
international business, international organizations and international NGOs — and
the consequent raising of expectations within those loose international elites about
the objectives, abilities, and responsibilities of international organizations, international organizations have volunteered and been volunteered for a variety of tasks
that, in a word, require forms of legitimacy that international organizations have
never had.
By ‘legitimacy’ in this context I mean merely that institutions act and be understood
to act with authority that is accepted as proper and moral and just — ‘right authority’,
to use the language of Augustine and Aquinas.70 I do not impute to it here any special
theoretical connotations; I am not locating it within the several contemporary
theories of legitimation, such as Habermas’s.71 I mean it in its most ordinary sense.
The only particular requirement I will adopt here is that legitimacy in today’s world
requires that it be perceived to be legitimate by those over whom authority is exercised.
In other times and places it might have been enough that one was the king, ordained
of God, and perceptions of the peasantry be damned, but I take it we are beyond the
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I have already given some references to the background literature on civil society; with reference to the
equally voluminous literature on ‘social movements’, see S.M. Lyman (ed.), Social Movements: Critiques,
Concepts, Case Studies (1995), and also the numerous articles in the social theory journal Telos
throughout the 1980s.
The classical terminology, that is, of the criteria of the just war.
J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. McCarthy (1975).
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point at which legitimacy can be separated, for very long, anyway, from its
perception; we call this apperception ‘democracy’ and the consent of the governed.72
Given that this article is addressed to a readership of international lawyers and
international law professors, I believe I am safe in assuming that my readers
fundamentally believe that international organizations, and their underlying concept
of ‘world government’ — what is today taken as the vision of Grotius73 — are
legitimate, and deserve to be understood as the world’s constitutionally supreme
sources of authority and the exercise of power. At a minimum, I think it safe to assume
that my readers believe that, in an ‘objective’ sense, the rule of ‘right reason’ —
international order — ought to govern the world — with wisdom, of course, and
properly conforming to the rule of subsidiarity, and deference in all matters not of vital
concern to local authority, and humility as to what can reasonably be dictated to the
periphery from the centre, and so on. But international, finally and supremely.
My experience of international public lawyers is that they believe this so thoroughly
that it is risking something like anathema to ask them for a defence of the legitimacy of
what is not quite ‘internationalism’ (which, after all, can mean multilateralism
among genuinely sovereign states), but is instead, as this article has used it,
‘supranationalism’ in all its glory.74 Public international lawyers tend to form a
church of those converted to belief in supranationalism, and it thus seems to them —
it seems to you — deeply pernicious to ask for a proof, in effect, of what in this church
constitutes the doctrine of transubstantiation and the immaculate conception. I have
already suggested that this conviction on the part of public international lawyers is a
belief in empire,75 the empire of international legalism, and it is a belief that for many
of you — perhaps most or nearly all of you — is fundamentally religious and mystical
in nature. You can scarcely imagine it otherwise.
For those for whom the virtue of this empire is a dogma beyond question, an article
of faith, the only question of legitimacy is thus my requirement — we might call it the
‘democracy requirement’ — that legitimacy is inseparable, in today’s world, from its
perception by those under authority. But because you cannot imagine that
supranationalism is truly illegitimate, the question of achieving legitimacy in the
‘perception’ sense is simply a matter of management of the masses to create this
perception of legitimacy. Because the brutal fact remains that international organizations as they exist today do not have the perception of legitimacy to carry out the
functions that international elites would assign to them, respect for legitimacy either
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This discussion finally returns, in other words, to the methodological discussion of Part 2.
I say ‘today’ because I am not so certain that Grotius would have conceived of it in those terms, but I will
not pursue that here.
I was, however, extremely pleasantly surprised at how civilly and courteously my admittedly heterodox
views were received by attendees at the conference at which this paper was first presented, at the
University of Michigan, September 1999. It was clear that these remarks were somewhat shocking to
several of the conferees, but although my views were vigorously disputed, it was done in a spirit of
courteous debate that I greatly appreciated. I learned a great deal from it and I hope that others learned
from me.
See Part 2 of this article.
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from the planet at large or from the specific populations who would be directly under
their governance.76
True, some populations have genuinely jettisoned the idea of national identity or
else submerged it into something else, into Europe if not the world. What does it mean
to be Dutch, for example, except to be European? What does it mean to be Canadian (at
least in the eyes of the Canadian government, to judge by its efforts to control and
purify its culture through broadcast and Canadian culture-content rules), except not
to be American? There are many more populations, to be sure, that have embraced the
ideal of an empire of international legalism in order to pursue the dream of ethnic,
religious or national identity under the aegis of the emperor.
I once had a conversation, not long before the Yugoslav Wars broke out, with a
Croatian nationalist who was simultaneously a genuinely liberal humanist.77 For him
the crucial task was to take Croatia inside the then-European Community, and he
wanted to be certain that the EC would be responsible for currency, central banking,
fiscal policy and defence. Surprised, I asked him why he wanted that empire to take
over what I would have regarded as the quintessential functions of the modern state,
the sine qua non of sovereignty; the answer was that all those were secondary and a
distraction from the main issue, which was the control of national culture. What he
insisted upon keeping under state control, in the name of ‘Croatianism’, were the
radio, television and the schools. The empire of the EC was to provide the guarantee of
nationalism and conditions for the purity of Croatian culture.
Notwithstanding those populations that have made their peace with supranational
empire, whether by seeing it as a thing into which to submerge oneself or as a space in
which to establish an identity as against presumed cultural enemies closer to home,78
the world system of international organizations inevitably has a huge ‘democracy
deficit’. It is perceived, both by the world and by its servants, to have a democracy deficit
because democratic legitimacy is precisely what it lacks. No one would seriously
dispute this, I think, not even the most hardened supranationalist. In my view — I will
not argue for this claim here, but simply declare it — the democratic deficit cannot be
overcome by any organization that proposes to organize at the level of the whole
76
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As de Waal, supra note 36, at 19, expresses it with respect to Bosnia and Nato — but the lesson is similar
elsewhere and with respect to UN operations — ‘Ultimately, Nato’s role in Bosnia is underwritten, not by
the mandate to hand over to newly developing Bosnian political institutions, but by its ability to threaten
overwhelming force’. One might also recommend the account of the downing of the US helicopter that
precipitated the US military withdrawal from Mogadishu, M. Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of
Modern War (1999), for a ground-up account of the difficulties of outside imperial forces in gaining
legitimacy even through the barrel of a gun; for an account of the intervention and aftermath in Haiti, see
B. Sacochis, The Immaculate Invasion (1999). The result is a tragic confusion of the roles of ‘police’ and
‘military’, with the possibility of large loss of life; for a discussion specifically of the differences in those
roles and how the attitudes of international elites confuse them, see Anderson, ‘Shame and the Honor of
Soldiers’, Panel on Law and Literature, American Society of International Law, April 1997, published in
ASIL Proceedings.
Author conversation, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991.
This is essentially the argument that George Konrad, the Hungarian intellectual and novelist, made for
how the Western democracies erred in fostering the Yugoslavia breakup. See Konrad, ‘Nationalism
Unleashed’, Nation, 3 May 1999, at 4.
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planet. I likewise doubt it can be overcome even within the physically, culturally, and
economically much smaller and much more homogenous European Union. Size and
the number of people governed ultimately matter, and the limits of what can
genuinely be called a ‘democratic’ political order are smaller than that which is
economically efficient to contain within the regime of a genuinely global common
market. The limits of democratic polity and the size of the economically efficient
common market are not necessarily coextensive.
But if that is so, and democracy cannot be had for the planet as a whole ‘thing’, but
only in its particular parts — one hopes, of course, in each and every one of them —
this does not change the fact that the legitimacy necessary to exercise power, and the
necessary perception of that legitimacy, are obtained in this world only on the basis of
democracy. The spread of democratic ideology worldwide is a great achievement, but
unfortunately for the legitimacy of international organizations also a great inconvenience. It is inconvenient because such legitimacy as they have — at least their
legitimacy to carry out the ever-stronger functions that globalizing elites79, whether in
governments, international organizations, much transnational business, and of
course international NGOs, would like them to carry out, such as keeping the peace,
managing the world economy, trying war criminals, and so on — has not hitherto
been based upon democratic assent. Yet now it is urgently needed, and where to get it?
The answer, unsurprisingly, is to turn to the only part of the so-called international
community — i.e., international elites — that appears to have a connection with
‘people’: international NGOs. The sudden obsequiousness of international organizations toward international NGOs can be simply explained that in the absence of being
able to look to actual populations of actual people, because that is at least unlikely and
perhaps, if I am right, impossible, then international NGOs are asked to stand in for the
‘people’. International organizations claim to have overcome the democratic deficit as
an impediment to their legitimacy by having as their partners, and having the moral
and political approval of, international NGOs, the voice of ‘world opinion’, and the
loud and incessant invocation of ‘international civil society’.80 If the issue is
effectiveness in affairs around the world, then the tone of international civil servants
need be nothing more than pragmatic and specific to circumstances. If, on the other
hand, the issue is legitimacy in a democratic sense, then the tone of international civil
servants properly ought to be the ideologically inflated language — the wholesale
adoption of metaphors taken from domestic democratic society — of ‘international
civil society’. Such an explanation denies nothing to the admirable achievements of
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Elsewhere, I have referred to these elites in ‘class’ terms; see Anderson, ‘Secular Eschatologies of the
Internationalized New Class’, supra note 38. Here in this article, I am deliberately using the term ‘elites’ to
avoid the theoretical connotations of class; I think that one can make out the argument in conventional
class theory, but I do not think it is necessary baggage for the argument of this article.
This seems to be at least partly the thinking of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee in awarding the prize to
such groups as the ICBL. See the sceptical article by Sellars, ‘The New Imperialists: Médécins sans
frontières is at the Heart of the Modern Global Establishment’, Spectator (London), 23 October 1999, at
26.
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many international NGOs, but does at least offer a reason why the praise has become
so ideologically extravagant.
The process of legitimation is symbiotic and not merely parasitic, however.
International NGOs, for their part, are happy to accept the accolade of ‘international
civil society’, the voice of the people, and so on, for the obvious reason that it increases
their power and authority within international organizations, international elites,
and beyond. Why shouldn’t an international NGO want to be described as the
fundamental source of legitimacy for international organizations? It can only gain
from the inflation of rhetoric. International organizations and international NGOs can
be seen as locked in a romance, a passionately mutual embrace, offering each other
love tokens of confirmations of legitimacy and eternal fealty, but, as with lovers
everywhere, oblivious to the world outside and oblivious as to whether anyone else
thinks that such mutual legitimations make either one any more ‘legitimate’.
To be sure, none of these dark objections makes any difference if it were the case that
international NGOs really are the authentic voices of democracy, really are authentic
intermediaries of the ‘people’, and so really confer legitimacy on international
organizations. If that were so, then even my view that genuine democracy at the level
of the whole planet sufficient to grant legitimacy to ‘strong’ supranationalism is
impossible might be overcome by the existence of democratic intermediaries. But this
is implausible, for at least two reasons.
First, what I have termed in this paper ‘international NGOs’ are not very often
connected, in any direct way, to masses of ‘people’. International NGOs, in virtue of
their role to operate globally rather than locally, are fundamentally elite organizations. There are exceptions, to be sure, but they are prototypically large religious
affiliations; the Roman Catholic Church is the prototype of a genuinely global
organization of civil society that is organized simultaneously locally and transnationally, drawing from the masses of the ‘people’, very rich and very poor and everything
in-between. But one does not see international organizations falling over themselves
to seek legitimacy from the Catholic Church or from any other church.
There are certain large secular exceptions, as well; Amnesty International is
perhaps one, in that at least it has a large base membership.81 But that membership
comes mostly from wealthy countries, and its membership even in those countries
tends to be educated and at least middle class; Amnesty and the Catholic Church are
not remotely in the same universe when it comes to the representativeness of their
members. And in any case, the far more typical ‘international’ NGO of the kind whose
approval and favour international organizations seek is much closer to the model of
Human Rights Watch — a relatively small, highly professional, entirely elite
organization funded by foundations and wealthy individuals in the Western
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See the Amnesty International website at www.amnesty.org for more information on Amnesty’s
membership and composition.
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democracies, and having no discernible base outside international elites.82 This is not
to denigrate Human Rights Watch or the vital work it does, but it would be the first to
declare that its legitimacy is not based on democratic roots among the masses but on
its fidelity to its own conception of the meaning of international human rights. The
legitimacy, if any, it confers upon international organizations in particular circumstances is on account of their fidelity to Human Rights Watch’s conception of the
meaning of international human rights. It does not represent anyone other than itself
and does not pretend to.
International NGOs collectively are not conduits from the ‘people’ or the ‘masses’ or
the ‘world citizenry’ from the ‘bottom up’. They are, rather, a vehicle for international
elites to talk to other international elites about the things — frequently of undeniably
critical importance — that international elites care about. The conversation is not
vertical, it is horizontal. It has a worthwhile, essential function in making the world —
sometimes at least, a better place — but it does not reduce the democratic deficit.
Second, if the idea of ‘international civil society’ is drawn by an analogy83 to civil
society in domestic society, then it bears noting that at least in the United States, with
its vigorous and diverse civil society, civil society is not conceived of as being a
substitute for democratic processes, let alone conveying democratic legitimacy. On the
contrary, the glory of civil society is precisely that it is something different from
democracy and democratic processes. The glory of civil society is not that it speaks
with the authenticity of the ‘people’, the ‘masses’, the popular will, the general will, or
with a single voice at all, but instead that organizations in civil society speak each for
itself.
Put bluntly, the glory of organizations of civil society is not democratic legitimacy,
but the ability to be a pressure group. Organizations in civil society do not share a
common vision of the good, nor need concern themselves with the common good, in
any holistic fashion at all if they choose not to. They have particular agendas and
particular issues and particular constituencies. But for that very reason, they are not
the voice of democracy and do not convey, at least in real democracies — rather than
faux-legitimate systems like those of international organizations — democratic
legitimacy. As David Rieff has aptly expressed it:
Human rights workers sometimes talk of their movement as an emblem of grass-roots
democracy. Yet it is possible to view it as an undemocratic pressure group, accountable to no
one but its own members and donors that wields enormous power and influence. For example,
82
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See Human Rights Watch’s website, www.hrw.org, for more information on membership and
composition; see also its United States informational tax filing as a non-profit organization on Form 990,
on file at the United States Internal Revenue Service or at the offices of Human Rights Watch, New York
(but soon to be online through new tax regulations).
As earlier noted, however, I think this analogy is inappropriate, for the reason that I do not think that
domestic society and international relations, however frequently termed ‘international society’ or the
‘international community’, are usefully construed in parallel. To put it another way, I think the idea of
the ‘international community’ is to presume a false conclusion; I do not think it exists in any sense in
which community means something in domestic society. It is a dangerously misleading metaphor, the
metaphor that causes liberal internationalists to believe, for example, that intervening in Kosovo is not
really war, it is merely an exercise in policework.
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would there have been a war in Kosovo without the human rights movement? As a supporter
of the war in Kosovo, I applaud the result. As a democrat, I worry.84

Pressure groups, organizations of civil society, depend upon democracy and the rule
of law, and reinforce those institutions as well, but they are not a substitute for them.
The irony is that many of those who believe that they have discovered in
‘international civil society’ the elusive democratic connection would not for a moment
imagine such a thing within their own, genuinely democratic, domestic societies: they
would recognize them for precisely what they are, political pressure groups. This is not
to deny the value of political pressure groups; at their best, they make all of society a
better place, and the same is true of the world at large, the planet, but they are not a
substitute for democracy. They speak for themselves, and so always leave open the
question Rieff has posed, with admirable insouciance, ‘so who elected the NGOs?’85

4 International NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratic
Legitimacy
This discussion has not strayed so far from the question of the landmines ban
campaign as might be imagined. The interpretations of the political meaning of the
ban campaign, and its legacies for the international system and lawmaking, held
widely among international elites and expressed with considerable eloquence,
especially, by the writers in To Walk Without Fear, presuppose an extensive ideology.
To challenge the conclusions they reach about the legacies of the international ban
campaign requires that one challenge the presumptions, often very large, which their
ideologies make. I have endeavoured to do so by counterposing, in necessarily sketchy
form, an alternative ideology, one which I suggest better fits the facts about
international civil society and international organizations than the one prevalent
among international elites.
I have further suggested that there are powerful motivational reasons among
international elites themselves for why they would adopt a view of democracy and
civil society that I doubt very much they would adopt with respect to domestic society.
The point, therefore, is that the ‘partnership’ envisioned by international elites
between international civil society, on the one hand, and sympathetic states and
international organizations, on the other, is not necessarily what it seems.86 I am a
strong supporter of a comprehensive global ban on landmines, but I am a supporter
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Rieff, supra note 68, at 41.
David Rieff, speaking at a panel discussion on landmines and international civil society, Washington
College of Law, American University, 25 February 1998.
I take it for granted that the position of sympathetic states in the landmines campaign is sufficiently close
to that of international organizations and, more generally, supranationalism as to render a discussion of
them separately in their relation to international NGOs unnecessary; the discussion would be much the
same.
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explicitly on the basis of what the leaders of the landmines ban campaign are, namely,
members of an emergent international elite. I am perhaps more strident in raising this
concern than others, but I am not alone in having it; Larry Cox, a former Amnesty
International staff member now at the Ford Foundation, has said:
Twenty years ago, when you went to a meeting at a human rights group, you saw all kinds of
people. But these days, you usually find that most of the people there are either lawyers or
human rights professionals. To me, the human rights movement has not been successful in
capturing the imagination of a broad group of people — the way, whatever I may think of
them, a strong civil-society group like the National Rifle Association has done.87

A ban on landmines is, to my mind, the morally and politically right thing to do, and
I hope and, as an international NGO activist, strive hard to cause the United States to
join the Ottawa Convention. But no matter how many non-governmental organizations across the globe adopt this position, they do not ‘democracy’ make. They — we
— are pressure groups, political lobbying groups, and they do not confer democratic
legitimacy, least of all upon the profoundly undemocratic organs of the international
system. Even within domestic society, civil society and its organizations are not
themselves the ‘democratic process’; they are part of the pressures brought to bear on
the outcomes of the democratic process. Organizations of civil society are by their
nature particular, and lack the ability to confer general legitimacy.88
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Quoted by Rieff, supra note 68, at p. 41.
It will be noted that this paper was drafted before the events at the Seattle World Trade Organization
meeting. Those events have raised a serious breach within the emergent international elites I have
described in this this paper, between at least some international NGOs and forces of global capitalism. The
elite international human rights organizations occupy a peculiar position within that breach, both
because they stand so assertively for internationalism and because the international human rights
movement has relied so strongly on global capitalism to open up non-western societies to its
proselytizing. But the analysis of the Seattle WTO meeting will to have to be another paper.

